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1972 : Year of Change 
Speakers are often tempted to start with the well-
worn cliche that "We are in a period of change'3" and that 
therefore problems are difficult to resolve. Is there 
any time period that is not one of transition from something 
old to something new? At least since the industrial revolution 
-- if not the beginning of civilization -- things have just 
refused to stand still. Despite these disclaimers, I never-
theless insist that 1972 is, more than usual, a moment of 
transition in the politics and economics of the world. 
So far as the Communities are concerned, 1972 is a 
year which follows the completion of the enlargement 
negotiations but precedes the actual entry of the four applicants 
into the Communityo So far as the United States is concerned, 
the trip to China of President Nixon is just one indication 
of the degree to which some of our basic policies are in 
flux. In the trading world the OECD high level group has 
been meeting in Paris to consider future comprehensive trade 
negotiations. The United States, the European Communities 
and Japan have declared themselves in favor of beginning such 
negotiations in 1973. In the aftermath of the August 15 
crisis and the December 18 Smithsonian agreement, a 
reworking of the Bretton Woods arrangement is in the offing. 
A discussion of US/Community relations inevitably 
involves a review of the problems which divide us. It is 
essential to put these problems into proper perspective at 
the outset. The economic growth of Western Europe, the 
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establishment of the European Communities, the prospective 
enlargement of these Communities -- all these represent not 
a failure but a resounding success for European and for 
American policy. While many things have changed"sTnce the 
bleak days immediately following the end of the war, our 
striving for a united Europe has remained a constant. 
Facts and Ideas 
Relations between the United States and the Communities, 
like most other things, are as much a function of the ideas that 
people have as of the facts. It is paradoxical that many 
Americans manage simultaneously both to underestimate and over-
estimate the European construction -- no mean feat. Particular-
ly during the lean years for European integration -- 1963 to 
1969 -- but also since then many Americans have viewed the 
Communities as an inward-looking organization fostering trade 
among its member countries but having little political content 
and little awareness of the outside world. At the same time, 
impressP.d by the tremendous economic growth of the European 
countries and their ability to capture a growing share of 
world trade, many of these same Americans have expected a 
greater power of decision and a greater degree of cohesion from 
"that Brussels organization" than are possible at the present 
stage of development. The inevitable effect of holding such 
contradictory views simultaneously has been a growing sense of 
frustration, and, in fact, some hostility on the part of some 
Americans to Europe. 
It. is not just outside observers who have commented on the 
absence of political content in the activities of the 
European Communities. Recently a well-known journalist said, 
"Purtroppo il consiglio dei Ministri della CEE non fa vera 
politica, ma una piccola e miope opera di promozione e difesa 
d'interessi nazionali a breve termine ... " The writer of this 
sentence is our distinguished moderator, Signor Levi. 
The European Communities, not wishing to be outdone 
in paradoxical behavior, have simultaneously shown insufricient 
concern about their relations with the United States (and 
other third countries) and over-reaction to developments in the 
United States. One of the Communities' Commissioners, Herr 
Dahrendorf, has stated, "The European Communities are aware of 
their responsibilities as the largest trading partner in the 
worldo They are aware also of the profcund impact of their 
internal developments ... " I am sure that, intellectually, 
this is true of Professor Dahrendorf and his colleagues, 
but I have not found much evidence that internal debates on 
such matters as agricultural policy or the Yaounde Convention 








At the same time, flowing from the immediate postwar period 
when the United States was the dominant economic force in the 
world, the Communities tend to show exaggerated concern about 
actions of, or developments in, the United States. While there 
are encouraging signs of a better perspective in this regard, 
this type of reaction still takes place. A recent example · 
has been the great concern since the August 15 crisis that a 
change in parities would inevitably result in a European 
recession. This view was very widely held, though nobody 
bothered to explain why such a development was inevitable, in 
view of the fact that European countries, like the United States, 
have available to them the same instruments of monetary and 
fiscal policy to counteract such a development. Less than a month 
ago there was a headline in the International Herald Tribune, 
"Bank Experts Dismiss Euro-Slump as a Myth. 11 I am not sure that 
it is yet considered a myth in Europe. 
Many Europeans -- perhaps most -- firmly believe that the 
United States has altered its position with respect to European 
integration. If you ask these people why they believe this, the 
answer is normally a logical exposition of the reasons why the 
United States might have, or should have, changed its policy. It 
is difficult to know how to respond to such people, since they are 
usually not convinced by quotations. I shall, nevertheless, cite 
the President's Foreign Policy Report to Congress of February 9: 
"Both to us and to them ,[our allies]' the 
advantages of European unification were 
unambiguous •.. No inconsistency was seen 
between European unity and broader Atlantic 
unity ... This essential harmony of our 
purposes is the enduring link between a 
uniting Europe and the United States. This 
is why we have always favored European 
unity ... " 
U.S. Trade Problems with the EC 
It is important to distinguish between official United States 
policy and the views of individual Americans. It would be foolish 
to deny that many individual Americans view the European 
Communities with less friendliness today than they did in 19 58 
when the Common Market was first formed. Some of the reasons for 
this I have already cited. There are other reasons which relate to 
Vietnam and to internal American problems, and there has been some 
tendency to attribute the blame for our balance of payments 
problem to the actions of our major trading partners, including 
Europe. 
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It is widely believed in the United States that our trading 
policies are more liberal than those of any other country, 
that we have been fleeced in past negotiations, and that the 
time has come to be much tougher and to protect ourselves from 
massive imports from abroad. As Macaulay remarked in 1824, "Free 
trade, one of the greatest blessings that a government can confer 
on a people, is in almost every country unpopular." It is 
certainly true that protectionist sentiment has grown in the 
United States and that one of the excuses its p~oponents have 
used has been the alleged protectionism of other countries. 
Americans are not alone in this type of behavior. Europeans 
are also quick to detect others' sins and to deplore them loudly 
while failing to observe their own. Our efforts to achieve 
voluntary restraint agreements with the Japanese have been 
deplored on this continent. Yet the Communities insist on 
retaining a safeguards clause in the trade agreement which 
they are negotiating with the Japanese. 
The two most important areas of contention in the trade 
field between the United States and the European Communities are 
the Common Agricultural Policy and preferential arrangements. 
Since I am speaking in Rome, it is not necessary to spell out in 
great detail the problems which arise for the United States from 
the Common Agricultural Policy. Italy shares many of our 
concerns in this respect. Italy, like the United States, would 
like to see the price of corn kept down in the interest of 
increasing meat production. The Italians also share our view that 
simply raising prices does not enable the Community to deal with 
the problem of the standard of living of the poor farmers, and 
that other, more direct forms of assistance are necessary to 
achieve ~his goal, We agree with the Communities that all 
countries support agriculture for political and social reascns 
which sometimes do not do full justice to economic realities 1 
but it is our view that the Communities' approach is more 
protectionist than most other systems since it provides an 
absolute preference for domestically produced products and 
has no controls over production whatever. 
Another of our long-standing griefs is the proliferation of 
preferential arrangements by the Communities, The term 
"preferential arrangements" includes a number of different 
types of agreements -- such as, association agreements of 
European countries such as Greece and Turkey; the Yaounde 
Convention with the developing countries of Africa; the 
Mediterranean agreements, some of which have been concluded 
and some of which are still in process; and the prospective 
industrial free trade area with the so-called EFTA non-applicants. 
I do not propose to review these different types of agreements 
in any detail, but I would like to point out the major reasons 
for our concerns, which are not always fully understood in 





is that they call into question the guiding principle of GATT, 
most favored nation, without providing any clear trade 
philosophy to s~bstitute for it. In addition, these preferential 
arrangements have a tendency to multiply indefinitely since each 
new arrangement provides a reason for still a further one, Some 
of them can also affect our trade interests. 
Whenever the United States objects to the Communities' 
preferential arrangements, the usual response is to stress 
their political nature. Most Europeans are convinced that ~he 
United States is so myopic with respect to preferences that 
it fails to see the contribution which these agreements make to 
political stability. Let me assure you that many of us are well 
aware of the political reasons which have led the European 
countries to conclude arrangements with the African countries 
and with the Mediterranean countries. We understand the 
goals, but we question the means used to achieve these goals 
Our doubts do not relate to the desirability of close ties between 
Europe and Africa and the Mediterranean countries but to the 
device of preferential trading arrangements. We also find it 
difficult to reconcile the professed altruism of these 
preferences with the somewhat less fuan idealistic practice of 
exacting reverse preferences in return. It is simply absurd 
for poor countries to have to offer trade advantages to rich 
countries, particularly in view of the commendable record of 
the European Communities in providing assistance to developing 
countries. 
At the start of his monumental Story of Civilization, 
Will Durant states, "There is hardly an absurdity cf the 
past that cannot be found flourishing somewhere in the present." 
As an honest economist, I must confess that this judgment is at 
least as applicable to economics as it is to other fields of 
endeavor. Perhaps it is nowhere more pertinent than in inter-
national monetary matters; somehow, the subjects of money and 
gold tend to stimulate the irrational. 
More than 30 years ago when I was a student of economics, 
I learned about mercantilism, its shortcomings, and its 
presumed demise. So far as I can judge, it is still alive and 
kicking. Almost every country wants to have a surplus in its 
balance of payments and an ever increasing volume of reserves, 
preferably in gold. Furthermore, trade deficits are equated 
with sin and surpluses with virtue. A devaluation is generally 
considered a confession of failure, balance of payments are 
analyzed in terms of components or in geographic terms, and we 
are told that we have no trade problem but an investment 
problem, er that we have no trade problem with Europe but 
only with Japan or Canada. All of these are fallacies but 
they flourish along with reality. They do not make it easier, 
however, to deal with the international payments problems. 
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I do not propose to present a blueprint of a new 
Bretton Woods Agreement. However, having amused myself 
and, I hope, my audience as well -- by reciting these odd, 
contemporary myths, I believe it is incumbent upon me at 
least to point out the road to monetary rationality, In the j 
brave new world of the day after tomorrow gold hoards will be 
distributed to the jewellers and dentists; the dollar will be · 
a na~ional currency, subject to the same rights and responsibi-
lities as all others; the international currency unit will be 
managed internationally by mutual agreement; parity changes will 
take place more frequently than in the past and not just in 
response to crises provoked by festering payments imbalances. 
Turning from the substance of the problems between the 
European Communities and the United States to the means for 
dealing with them highlights yet another problem. We have tried 
to establish a consultative mechanism for reviewing our problems 
and we certainly have made some progress in dealing with the 
problems through this mechanism -- but neither side is entirely 
happy with it. It is simply not easy to devise an appropriate 
mechanism for consulting, let alone negotiating, with the 
Community. The institutional problem of arranging for a EC/US 
dialogue simply reflects the institutional problem of decisicn-
making within the European ·Communities. The member countries 
are well aware of this shortcoming, and various proposals have been 
made to improve the decision-making appartus, such as the 
establishment of European Ministers. While we can endeavor 
to improve the US/EC consultative mechanism under existing 
circumstances, in the final analysis it is largely dependent 
upon the institutional improvements that will be made within 
the Communities themselves, particularly after enlargement, 
Let me return for a moment to 1972. Things have not been 
quite as bad during the nearly three months of this year that have 
already gone by as might have been contemplated. The trade 
package agreed on February 4 has helped to clear the air. I 
think there is a determination on both sides to try to avoid 
regurgitating our arguments concerning the trade irritants 
which each finds in the practices of the other. There is a 
chance that, with good will, we can utilize 1972 to start the 
process and build up momentum in the crucial trade and monetary 
arrangements which face us over the next few years. 
1973 : Year of Promise 
In contrast to 1972, 1973 is a year of great expectations. 
It is the year when the major trading partners of the world 




It is also the year which will see the Community enlarged 
to 10 members, with all that that implies concerning the 
economic strength of this not-so-small Europe. Needless to 
say, there are some people in the world who will not welcome 
this development and who will fear the increased competition 
from this formidable entity. This is not true, however, of my 
government, Let me quote President Nixon's address on 
February 7 before the White House Conference on the Industrial 
World: 
"I do not believe that America has 
given up, that it will give up, Nor 
do I believe that we in America, because 
of the competition we face, will try 
to build a wall around ourselves ... 
"If we were to let this nation turn 
isolationist in its economic policy, 
we would be inviting a trade war --
and like the other kind of war, 
every nation on this nlanet would lose. 
We are not going to let either of these 
things happen. 
"We are not going to become isolationist 
in our foreign policy and we are not 
going to become protectionist in our 
economic policy. We are not about to 
forget the secret of the world's 
highest standard of living -- A 
competitive spirit that results 
in rising productivity." 
Enlargement does not merely mean growing economic 
strength and accelerating trade. Depending upon the will of the 
10 countries comprising the enlarged Community, enlargement 
could open the door to many things which have heretofore seemed 
hardly practical. It could mean a greater degree of political 
cohesion and harmonized foreign policy in Western Europe; it 
could even involve European defense cooperation within the 
broader Atlantic framework. From the current gropings, a true 
monetary and economic union, including a European capital 
market, that can take advantage of the resources and experience 
of the city of London could develop. This new entity could 
play a major role in the reform of the international monetary 
and trade systems, which could have as its major membership 
groupings the United States, a Western European entity, Japan, the 
developed co.untries of the Commonwealth and the LDCs. It could 
also have as a consequence a more stable East-West situation in 
Europe and the Mediterranean. 
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While the enlarged Communities will provide a challenge 
to the United States, it is a challenge which we welcome, On 
balance, the implications for United States interests 
would be basically favorable. We would expect a greater sharing 
responsibility for world stability, security, and prosperity. 
Having painted this favorable picture, it is necessary to 
raise some doubts in order to be realisitic. No one can now 
be certain whether the members of the enlarged Community will, 
in fact, realize the potential for advance now opening before 
them. One of the key questions is whether the Europeans will 
succeed in devising common policies in such areas as monetary 
union and foreign policy and, furthermore, whether such policies 
will be compatible with U.S. policies. As I have said earlier, 
it is our judgment that the answers to these questions are a 
favorable affirmative, but no one can be absolutely sure 
about this. 
EC Institutional Problem 
Although 1973 is a year when much should be accomplished, it 
is also -- I regret to use this term again -- a year of 
transition in the development of an enlarged Europe and in 
the relations of Europe with the rest of the world. The 
institutional problems which have made life difficult over 
the last few years will not suddenly disappear. It is 
hardly necessary for me to explain to this audaence how 
painful a process it is for the Community to arrive at decisions 
and how virtually impossible it is to change a decision once it 
has been reached. Negotiations with third countries are 
incredibly complex and, in fact, one can question whether the 
term "negotiation" is applicable at all. The Commission is 
given a mandate by the Council of Ministers; it states its 
position in terms of the mandate; it hears what the other side 
has to say; and th~ unless the other side accepts the 
Communities' position, the Commission can only go back to the 
Council to have the mandate changed. 
One consequence of the institutional problem is that the 
Community has not produced the sort of initiatives one would 
expect from such a new organization. The Community has also been 
deficient in its public relations, and this has contributed to an 
image abroad which does not always do justice to the policies and 
accomplishments of the Community. For example, on December 12 
the Council agreed upon a declaration of intent which represented 
an important step forward in terms of agreeing to wide-ranging 
trade negotiations, including agriculture and non-tariff 
barriers. Not merely have the Communities failed to 
advertise this important step but they actually attempted to 
keep this declaration of intent secret for a while. 
Another shortcoming of the Community institutions which is, 








accredited to the .community, is the relative paucity of attention 
paid to third countries. Quite understan~ably, perhaps,.the . 
attention of those portions of the Community concerned with third 
country relations has been focused on the countries with which t~e 
Community has negotiated~ or is negotiating, agreements of one kind 
or another. The other countries of the world have found it 
necessary to knock loudly on the Communities' door if they 
wish to be heard at all. Sometimes the door has remained shut, 
despite loud knocking. Several countries, including fairly 
recently Japan, have requested regular consultations with the 
European Communities. For various reasons these consultations 
have been refused. 
Outlook 
There are reasons to believe that this situation will 
improve after enlargement. The problem is recognized by many 
Commission officials, and there are reorganization plans now 
under consideration which will tend to place greater stress 
on foreign relations. Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that 
the British, who have been on the outside looking in for so long, 
are keenly aware of the problem and will try to remedy it. 
Finally, it is most heartening to note the important place 
relations with third countries ha\eon the agenda of next 
October's Summit meeting. 
Economically, 1971 can hardly be described as a brilliant 
year for the United States. Nevertheless, despite the 
stagnation, the record balance of payments deficit, and 
the suspension of convertibility, our policy towards Europe 
has been firmly maintained by President Nixon. 
The basic goals of the Community are at least as much 
political as economic. The main reason for our continying 
support is that we consider its basic political goals to be 
in the American interest. We are in favor of a process that 
puts an end to the centuries of internal strife in 
Western Europe. And we welcome the evolution of a Europe 
that -- by working together -- can make a more significant 
independent contribution to the resolution of our common 
economic, political and security problems. Whatever 
differences Europe and the United States have had thus far, 
our common interests have prevailed, and we are confident 
that they will continue to prevail so long as both sides 
make a major effort to keep them in view. 
* * * * * * * 
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